Abstract
This article focuses on the ius theutonicum Magdeburgense, its meaning and functions, attempting to understand what ius theutonicum meant for contemporaries. It starts with the present interpretation of the term. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the available medieval privileges for Magdeburg law issued for towns in Galician Rus'. The result was not an identification or »reconstruction« of a particular »law« or combination of different »laws« adopted in town courts of Galician Rus' under the term ius theutonicum. It was rather the recognition that the notion called ius theutonicum in medieval documents was an adaptable pattern applicable to different conditions, a model with many variants or a general set of principles which was filled with real content and adapted to concrete circumstances.
collected for this research did not give, at first glance, any idea of the »normative« content of the new »law«: assuming that »law« should be a certain set of »norms« and rules, ideally a codified set.
1
It was generally accepted that »German law« was brought by settlers and subsequently denoted as ius theutonicum.
2 According to Schubart-Fikentscher, one has to think that, especially at the beginning, it meant customary law (»Gewohnheitsrecht«), without implication of any concrete town law.
3 Some authors saw it as a combination of the »Sachsenspiegel« with Magdeburger town law. 4 In this way ius theutonicum, being presumably imported by Germans themselves, was implicitly or explicitly identified with a kind of German ius scriptum, or with combinations of certain iura. The term ius theutonicum was translated directly as »Deutsches Recht« or »German law«, and modern researchers have worked predominantly with a translated version of the term (as »law«). However, as often happens, a linguistic change turns into a change in modern understanding.
5
The secondary literature revealed how scholars had solved similar problems in other regions; they first looked at the sources for the law of Magdeburg , and then tried to find similar sources in their own region, searching the contents of town law books and other legal manuscripts. This method did not work in the case of Galician Rus', however, because the legal manuscripts with which the new »law« supposedly spread are practically absent. Still, a relatively high number of preserved medieval privileges for towns »under Magdeburg law« (several dozens), and an even higher number for villages (also founded with the same »law«) is surprising and forces one to find another explanation. The impossibility of conducting research based on traditional written sources for Magdeburg law points to the need for clarification of the term ius theutonicum, of the meaning and functions associated with it in medieval Galician Rus.
Historiography
The volume of writings dealing with the subject of ius theutonicum is enormous. Studies written by Polish and German authors are especially numerous. 6 The present overview is focused mainly on Ukrainian historiography which is seldom included in interna-
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German Law in Medieval Galician Rus' (Rotreussen) tional discussions and surveys, and has been developing in isolation until the present day.
One can distinguish at least three periods in Ukrainian scholarship. Representatives of the first period, dated from the second half of the nineteenth to the early twentieth century, being concerned with writing a »national history« tried to evaluate the role of German law in the history of Ukrainian towns and Ukrainian lands in general. One of the most renowned legal historians of that time, Vladimirskiy-Budanov, saw the adoption of German law as the reason for the decay of towns in Polish and Lithuanian lands: »privileges were the reason for the collapse of the nobility's state; similarly the main cause of urban decay was attributed to privileges and special rights of towns.« 7 His contemporary Antonovych argued that urban decay was caused by social differentiation, and German law aimed to be a remedy in such conditions, although without success. Kistiakivskyi, writing in 1879 about the eighteenth-century law book Prava, za yakymy sudytsia malorosiyskyi narod (Laws According to which Ukrainian People Judge Themselves), dedicated one chapter to the history of German law and its codifications.
8 Another scholar, Bahaliy, who first published his study on Magdeburg law on so-called Left-Bank Ukraine (that is, Ukrainian lands on the left bank of the Dnipro/Dnepr river) in 1892 (and later in a Ukrainian translation in 1904), stressed that the fundamental feature of the law was to separate town dwellers into a closed group. In his opinion, this was suitable for the social order of Poland, but the Ukrainian folk could not accept this organization because it contradicted Ukrainian historical traditions and was, therefore, alien.
9 A general conclusion in these studies suggested that German law was perceived as a foreign concept transmitted mechanically to Ukraine and therefore it could not be fully accepted by the »Ukrainian town folk.«
10
The idea of German law as being alien and artificial in Ukrainian lands also prevailed in scholarship at the beginning of the twentieth century. These views were present in the works of Hrushevsky, particularly in the fifth volume of his History of Ukraine-Rus' (first published in 1905) dealing with the social and political histories of Rus' territories from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century.
11 In his opinion, urban communities formed under the foreign, »ready-made« law, isolated from each other and unable to cooperate with each other, were made helpless.
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Olha Kozubska-Andrusiv Moreover, foreign ethnic groups occupied the main urban centers of Rus', reducing the autochthonous population there to minority status. Thus, in his view, the history of urban society organized according to German law was, with a few exceptions, a history of decline and decay.
12
However, another Ukrainian scholar, Jakowliw, revised the attitude from negative to positive: writing abroad and publishing his work in German in Leipzig (1942) , he saw »German/Magdeburg law« as a direct import from German lands incorporated into Ukrainian legal traditions. Magdeburg was perceived as a direct model for Ruthenian towns (and villages), and its law imported there in »full dimension«, 13 although no one knows »the full dimension« of Magdeburg law, since it had never been recorded in its »full dimension.« Denying the importance of Poland's mediation in the process of adoption, he saw the Polish Kingdom as responsible for all the negative effects, while the adoption of German law (in a form of the law of Magdeburg) had a positive influence on urban life.
14 Similarly, this point of view was greatly influenced by the author's contemporary political situation.
Generally, these studies concentrated mostly on the evaluation of the adoption of German law »from a Ukrainian point of view,« regarding the influence it had on Ukrainian population, which was seen as a passive recipient (if not a victim). The view of ius theutonicum as a »ready-made« foreign law imposed from above on the indigenous people of Rus' implies that German law was often understood as a rigid set of rules and regulations imported in a process similar to modern law transfer.
During the Soviet era (the second period), research on »Ger-man law« or medieval urban self-government was unwelcome or treated negatively, likewise seeing German law as »aggression« from outside.
15 At the same time, some historians considered it necessary to counterbalance the flourishing of Western urban life in the Middle Ages with local examples. Following this idea, a Ukrainian scholar, Otamanosvky, denied that towns in a legal sense appeared in Ukraine only with the reception of German law. He emphasized that codices of Old Rus' law (»Rus'ka Pravda«) served as the legal grounds for urban organizations in Kievan Rus' from the eleventh to the thirteenth century, and stressed that Polish kings conducted a policy of annihilation of this specific form of town by introducing German law. »urban law« out of »Rus'ka Pravda« (when in reality this source did not even distinguish between »urban« and »rural«) demonstrated how artificial and biased research was when it came to questions of comparative legal history. The artificial character of many Soviet »official« ideas and theories, as well as the necessity to apply these »official« ideas in regional studies, often caused distortion and misunderstanding of historical phenomena. The third period in legal-historical research is associated with the time when Ukraine obtained the status of an independent state in the early 1990 s. Communist historiography in Ukraine has been transformed into national historiography without a struggle. The ideas of Soviet times were easily replaced with ideas connected to the national paradigm, although the carriers of those ideas remained the same. The carriers, authors, adapted to the new situation simply by changing colors from red (communist) to blueand-yellow (national), and proclaiming the previously forbidden M. Hrushevsky the new classic instead of Marx or Lenin.
17
During the last fifteen years of Ukrainian statehood, the spread of ius theutonicum has become a »trendy« subject, though ideological concerns have played a certain role in this revival of interest. Some recent studies on the adoption of »German law« were aimed at identifying »democracy and progressive traditions« in Ukrainian towns (in contrast, for instance, to Russian ones). On the other hand, this interest has resulted in new investigations, publications of source material, and scholarly forums to discuss matters of urban self-government.
18 Magdeburg or German law is mentioned in the most recent handbook on Ukrainian history; it is seen as a synonym for »town law« and positively evaluated as a factor leading to urban independence.
19 Scholars of younger generations have also turned to the subject of German law. For instance, Zayats has studied the process of town foundations under Magdeburg law in Wolhynia. 20 Another person who has contributed to German law scholarship in Ukraine is Hoshko, who has concentrated both on the history and the historiography of Magdeburg law.
21 She interpreted the process of adoption of ius teutonicum in Ukrainian lands as »integration into European legal space,« although she does not provide an explanation of what »European legal space« in the Middle Ages meant.
22
Indeed, the presence of modern notions in works on medieval history is striking; another example is a statement that Magdeburg law »promoted … the strengthening of democratic tendencies, legal culture, and was one of the most important agents of integration of Ukrainian society into European civilization.« 23 Such passages demonstrate an inability to speak about this epoch in terms appropriate to it and may signify that some historical phenomena are still explained insufficiently or inadequately, despite rejecting negative attitudes that were typical for Soviet and pre-Soviet studies. A lack of understanding of the nature of medieval customary laws on the one hand, and uncritical use of constructs and terms of secondary literature on the other, has led to misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the ius theutonicum quod est ius Magdeburgense mentioned in privileges.
Therefore, the aim of this study is to interpret ius theutonicum from a new perspective and to consider more closely written primary sources (mainly royal privileges) from Galician Rus,' whose references have been used as a basis for the issue of ius theutonicum Magdeburgense. At the same time, this will not be a search for the »universal meaning« of ius theutonicum. Even an unchanged, coherent system functioned differently under different regional conditions; and a system which is not necessarily coherent changes in time and is probably understood and used in different ways during different periods.
Ius theutonicum as a New System of Settlement Organization
A privilege typically explained ius theutonicum as an alternative to the existing order. This term emerged by the thirteenth century in the western Slavic territories neighboring the German lands and should be, therefore, understood as a mark of separation from the ius of indigenous Slavic populations and identified with the special position of German settlers there.
24 It signified a safeguarded legal standing, a set of rights and exemptions granted to Germans.
In Silesian documents from the thirteenth century, applied here for comparative purposes, the two terms held the key position: locare (sometimes collocare) and ius theutonicum. Thus, a village was usually iure teutonico locata (1251); but one could also talk about villam … iure teutonico populandam (1264), literally »a vil-lage to be populated according to ius theutonicum,« which meant that people were settled there according to »German law«. 25 It is necessary to keep in mind the variety of meanings of the Latin word locare. It was used in privileges to define two possible acts: the act of foundation of a new settlement and the act of renting already existing settlements.
Abandoned local law was often defined through gravaminibus, angarias et perangarias iuris polonici, which was the reason to interpret ius theutonicum as a form of liberty or freedom. However, libertas teutonicorum was a relative freedom, because the act of liberation from local burdens 26 was usually followed by the list of iura et servicia coming ex dicto iure Teutonico. In this way, the privileges were dealing not so much with freedoms and rights as such, but rather with replacing one type of obligations with another, so freedom was, in fact, only the release from older burdens.
Privileges for ius theutonicum issued for villages and towns in Galician Rus' also declared freedom from local »laws« and typically contained the phrase: 
28
Organizations of medieval royal estates (as well as private ones) apparently required the preservation of the old system (labor services or payment in naturals) in some of the villages, and even foundations of new settlements according to ius Ruthenicum.
29
The apparent necessity to settle people under »Ruthenian law« was evident from sources: Phyl, a servant from the village Kostarowce (first mentioned in 1390), sold his land property (agrum servilem) into »German law« to a certain Lawr in 1446, promising to free this estate from obligations regarding the castle of Sanok; nevertheless, the court of Sanok castle declared this transaction invalid and ordered Phyl to come back and serve more Ruthenico or to settle someone who could do it instead of him. draw our attention to the fact that the term ius theutonicum (similarly to iura Polonicalia vel Ruthenicalia) used in privileges had very much to do with the determination of the system according to which a settlement had been organized (or certain people settled), defining the type of relationships between owners and settlers. In this context, »German law« pointed to a different system of relationships. Why were rights and duties coming from »German law« more attractive than those of iura Polonicalia vel Ruthenicalia? The main right was certainly the hereditary use of land (»Erbzinsrecht«) and, consequently, the main obligation was the yearly rent payment, census or census hereditarius. As a rule the rent for burghers was calculated in coin, while the taxed unit was measured in mansi franconici. The payment varied (e.g., one marc, three fertones, twenty-four grossi) depending on the town and its economic potential, taking into account inflation as well as the time of issuing of the privilege. Sometimes no concrete sum was indicated, but it mentioned the rent prout alie nostre civitates in terra Russie solvere (a privilege for the town of Zhydachiv, 1393) or according to censo nostro regio (a privilege for the town of Horodok, 1389). The date of payments was usually fixed -die Sancti Martini (November 11) -the most widely accepted time for payment also in German territories and in Silesia. Often, especially in a new foundation, burghers were freed from paying rent for a certain period of time calculated from the date of the privilege. The longest liberation was given for clearing woods (up to twenty years), while in the »old« fields (in antiquis agris) it was usually six years.
What attracted attention in the study of privileges was that they explicitly introduced a uniform right of land use for every settler and that the taxed unit was always the same. This equal settling right and ascription to a specified court (i.e., a local court established according to »German law«) signified the emergence of an autonomous community, settled under ius theutonicum and subjected to the local court [of the landlord]. Therefore, ius theutonicum could be interpreted also as a strategy for establishing communities, urban or rural.
Membership in the community and a share in the settlement's commodities, land first of all, were closely interrelated. In this way a settlement under ius theutonicum represented legally and physically closed and delimited space; it had defined borders in con-trast to settlements existing under ius Ruthenicale or Polonicale. A special right directly related to it was the so-called »Bannmeile« -a prohibition to build a tavern or organize an enterprise in the radius of one mile of the town, securing the town's monopoly and jurisdiction over that area.
31 Among other rights and freedoms shared by members of a community was the right to exploit natural resources such as woods for building and heating, fishing rights and communal use of land free from rent.
Terms of relationships between settlers and the owner, especially regarding census payments, were included in almost every privilege or contract. These documents did not convey all possible fields of interactions. Quite important »freedoms« such as an annual market, exemptions from tolls in other royal towns, or a staple right were specified in additional charters.
Thus the transformation coming from ius theutonicum manifested itself not in diminishing burdens but rather in rationalizing and standardizing them. In general, a broad range of obligations, duties and services, usual and eventual, were replaced with a fixed rent payment paid (in coin and/or grain) on a specified date.
Questions of Law and Jurisdiction and Legal Reality
As follows from the documents, ius theutonicum was defined as antagonism to existing local customs and at the same time as liberation from them, and therefore as a variant of immunity. As already mentioned, the transfer to ius theutonicum inevitably meant the withdrawal (at least partial) of duties and obligations coming from older local »laws.« It meant also immunity from the jurisdiction of intermediary officials and protection from summons before any court other than the seigniorial. Compared with the Silesian document from the thirteenth century that exempted »only« ab omni iurisdictioni nostri castellani et ab aliorum iudicum et officialium, late medieval charters from Galician Rus' presented an extensive list of different officials who, from now on, had presumably no authority over privileged burghers.
32
Liberation from the jurisdiction of castellani et palatini became a usual element in the immunity clauses of the charters in the second half of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. In the second decade of the fourteenth century, with the spread of »land courts« (»Landgericht«, Polish -»sąd ziemski«) and its officials -iudices et subjudices -these two soon found their place in the clause as well. The office of the starost (capitaneus) emerged during Kasimir III's reign (1333-1370); therefore some privileges started to mention also this authority in immunity clauses. Thus, the formulary gave an impression that a privilege totally excluded recipients from the local jurisdiction. 33 However, the reality was certainly different: while the judicial activity of castellani et palatini gradually declined by the end of the fourteenth -beginning of the fifteenth centuries,
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it was hardly possible that other types of courts (land courts or courts of capitanei), operating according to the Polish land law, were restrained from judging »Germans.« In spite of the statement of immunity clauses, cause magne, capital sentences or cases connected to bloodshed (cause majores, cause graviores or in causis sanguinis) were typically reserved to the competence of the sovereign all over medieval Europe. No doubt, a similar situation was also in Lesser Poland.
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Moreover, quite unreal appeared to be any exemption from the jurisdiction of the capitaneus, especially in the case of royal estates: at the turn of the fourteenth century, every royal town or village was under the authority of a certain capitaneus. In that case, the liberation from his authority would mean freedom from control of the king as the owner.
36
Contradictions between the existing land law and the immunity formula were due to the anachronism of the latter. The formulary had been developed since the early thirteenth century and corresponded to a different reality (i.e., to Germans coming to settle in Polish duchies). Conditions for the adoption of ius theutonicum in Lesser Poland during the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries were different, but the formulary was not adequately adapted to those changes.
37
Still, although clauses or formulae might not adequately correspond to reality, one could not deny the effectiveness of the immunity according to »German law« and the benefits flowing from it. First of all, immunities created the basis for an autonomous court: self-judgment was another important element of ius theutonicum, and privileges emphasized jurisdiction and competence of such a court.
Exemptions were usually followed by a formal permission for the advocatus to judge, and by further definitions of his compe- 38 As is known, the competence of the court according »to German law« was much more limited in reality; and these limits implied also the conclusion of the clause, forbidding encroachments on royal rights (regalia).
Was the passage referring to the ius theutonicum and its »articles, paragraphs, etc.,« evidence for the above-mentioned »materielles Recht«? Or was it an explicit reference to those numerous legal codices that presumably spread together with ius theutonicum? Probably the earliest reference to »books of Magdeburg law« appeared in the privilege of Kazimir III the Great, concerning the establishment of formula« was a typical feature of privileges originated in the ecclesiastical chancelleries of Great Poland (i.e., the majority -140 -from the chancellery of the Archbishop of Gniezno), while the chancellery of Kasimir III (the Great), for instance, used it only three times; and, moreover, the clause was not known in the first period of the reception of »German law.« 42 Again, taken literally, this clause might speak about certain samples of »norms« for »German law« in its particular version (i.e., that of Magdeburg or Neumarkt), which was not familiar to the ruler. However, the provenance of the charters, containing this clause (i.e., ecclesiastical chancelleries) suggested no real relation to any »law« of the mentioned towns. Simply, the ecclesiastical notary, who certainly had some knowledge of canon and, possibly, Roman law, applied the terminology of »scholarly laws« without paying much attention to its suitability. As was convincingly proven by J. Matuszewski, the origin of the clause was certainly »das gelehrte Recht«: taken from Paulus (regula est, iuris quidem ignorantiam cuique nocere, D. 22, 6.9 pr.) this passage on ignorantia iuris was probably transmitted via Gratian's Decretum (item, ignorantia iuris alia naturalis, alia civilis. D. 2 c. 1. qu. 4 § 2), while a notary created ignorantia iuris Theutonici out of it.
43 Mentioned ornatus causa in order to show the notary's awareness of ignorantia iuris, this formulary was inflexibly repeated for centuries and should not be taken as evidence about real knowledge in the contemporary Polish elite concerning ius theutonicum. To a great extent, the presence of legal terminology demonstrated a certain stage in the reception of the »scholarly law«, but not that of »German law.« At this point the reception was no more, but not less, the transfer of abstract thoughts into writing practice and the introduction of terminology learned by one scribe from another, more experienced one, or at a university.
As noticed by S. Kuraś, the quality of a document sometimes reversely corresponded to the education of the notary: the more educated he was the more abstract, ornate and sometimes inadequate documents he produced.
44 Generally, chancellors and notaries in the royal chancellery had some knowledge of ius utrumque, 45 but were not familiar with the administration and legislation of towns. This passage, like the »ignorance formula«, was only a conventional clause of the chancellery serving as one more confirmation of the durability of legal formulae used through centuries. 48 What, however, cannot be explicitly seen in privileges is »die Anwendung materiellen deutschen Rechtes« mentioned by Menzel in his study on Silesian documents.
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49 Establishing a new system of justice, the granter nevertheless did not regulate the question of law to be used there. At least it was not obvious from medieval privileges. A relevant parallel served here the example of »die Kulmer Handfeste« studied by Willoweit: for the Teutonic Order, granting this privilege, it was not important what law was used in the court, but how (according to which »law«) it was organized, that is, its functionality.
50
Dealing with the history of legal reception required clear distinctions: organization of the court (»Gerichtsverfassung«) according to ius theutonicum, and laws or customs used in that court (»Entscheidungsregeln«), represented two different subjects and should, therefore, be treated separately. Concerning the latter, we do not have information on how much of the »Schöffensprüchen« from Magdeburg were incorporated in jurisprudential practice in concrete settlements established according to »German law« in Galician Rus'. Also, we have almost no information on how medieval manuscripts were used there and where they were used. Since Schöffen's sentences were based on personal jurisprudential experience (»Rechtskenntnis«), where this experience was obtained was certainly important for the content of their sentences. Whether the judge was a German, who obtained his »knowledge of law« in his home land, or a Pole -in Poland -appeared to be significant for their judgments. It was not necessary that a settlement with Polish or Ruthenian inhabitants would turn to German customary law while solving internal disputes after the grant of ius theutonicum.
Privileges establishing a local system of justice in towns and villages under ius theutonicum did not regulate which law should be used in the court. When ius theutonicum in medieval Ruthenian privileges was first of all a definition of a type of settlement and its specific rights and obligations, then ius theutonicum Magdeburgense in the case of Ruthenian towns had no direct relevance to the actual law of Magdeburg (symptomatically, the adjective Magdeburgense was not mentioned in thirteenth-century documents), and even to a »family« of this law (in contrast to Polish and Silesian towns that had direct contacts with Magdeburg).
Advocatus and Problem of Town Freedom
Privileges for ius theutonicum showed a prominent position of organizers of settlements -locatores -known subsequently as advocati in towns and sculteti in villages. The advocatus acted as a mediator (»Zwischeninstanz«) between the owner and settlers: he represented a community before the lord and was himself a lord's representative for settlers, being at the same time relatively independent from both sides. Due to the fact that most existing charters for ius theutonicum were agreements between the settlement owner and the advocatus, terms and conditions of the advocatus's duties and rights were given the central position. He secured this outstanding position ratione locationis, that is, due to his efforts, resources and experience invested in the organization of a new settlement. Advocati were the main authority in the community. Among the rights granted to the advocatus/scultetus the most important was the right of hereditary possession of advocacia, with permission for alienation.
51 Additionally there were usually: a share in the court fee (1/3) and in the yearly rent (1/6), certain measure of land free of tax (up to six mansi), fishing and hunting rights, and a possibility to establish taverns, mills, ponds, shops and workshops. Although rights of the advocatus were listed in detail, they all showed a great deal of similarity and were often referred to in documents as ius or mos scultetorum.
52
Starting from the late thirteenth century, a privileged group comprised of advocati and sculteti with a distinctive set of rights (iure scultecie/iure advocacie) emerged in Polish medieval society. They had a great freedom, at least until the mid-fifteenth century, in managing their possessions and positions, much greater than dominium utile would allow. buying possessions and positions of advocatus and scultetus. As a result, more and more cases connected to settlements according to »German law« went to the land law courts, while the supreme courts of ius theutonicum increasingly lost their competence and declined, except in Krakow, during the second half of the sixteenth century.
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Initially, every settlement established according to ius theutonicum was under the leadership of advocatus (or scultetus in case of a village). Therefore, the foundational process »according to ius theutonicum« did not free a town from its owner. The grant of ius theutonicum did not automatically mean self-governing freedom for a town, any more or less than for a village; and it did not mean withdrawal of traditional holders. Urban self-government was not implicit for German law, rather it represented a certain stage of development of town foundations; and limits of obtained autonomy differed from case to case. 56 The level of freedom in every town was defined by the owner; as a rule royal towns had more freedom than private ones.
At the same time, the institute of an advocatus could enhance the formation of organs of self-government. Richer urban communities were able to buy the office of advocatus, limiting the influence of a land lord and took themselves all duties connected to external and internal policy. Gradually a town council, a representative organ of an urban community, developed and this was interpreted as a sign of urban self-government.
57 Unfortunately, there is no information from the medieval period concerning how town councils of Rus' were elected and functioned, but sources from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as well as parallels to other Polish towns demonstrated that this institution was traditionally concerned with organization and regulation of trade and production in towns.
Motivations for Adoption of ius theutonicum and Royal Policy
Motives for a grant of ius theutonicum were expressed in privileges schematically. Nevertheless, formulary used to express the motives reflected general expectations, political programs and goals connected with such a grant. As a rule, documents connected 
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Charters for Ruthenian towns issued at least a century later demonstrated a development in the formulary used by the chancellery, but fewer changes in motives. Almost every privilege for German law stressed the process of reformation and re-organization, while expressing the motivations for a new foundation: cupientes terram nostram Russie per civitatum locacionem maioribus utilitatibus reformare. 59 The right to found a town belonged exclusively to kings, being a part of regalia; therefore, initially most towns were founded on the royal domain; their foundations and development were important agents in re-structuring and re-organizing the economic basis of the state.
Famous for his foundational activity, Kazimir III (the Great) conducted intensive reforms on Ruthenian lands after they were incorporated into the Polish Kingdom. In fact, most of the important Ruthenian urban centers here were re-chartered or transferred to Magdeburg law during his reign (1349-1370). Furthermore, the majority of foundations of that period were royal ones. The foundational policy in Poland changed greatly during the reign of Wladyslaw II Jagiello (1387-1434); along with the emergence of royal towns, private foundations took place more and more often. In general, the royal initiative in Poland was dominant during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when royal estates were developed and re-organized. An increase in private foundations became prominent in the fifteenth century, along with the development of private landed estates and the strengthening of the position of the nobility in the Polish Kingdom at the expense of royal power. At the same time, the volume of ecclesiastical foundations was quite meager in the context of urban development of Galician Rus'.
In spite of the division of »motivation statements« according to the rulers who issued the privileges, they dealt with similar motives and often with similar formulary to express them. The adoption of ius theutonicum was recognized as an appropriate way to augment revenue for the kingdom and its inhabitants (or for the Roman Church in ecclesiastical foundations), to cultivate and populate the land »because no profit comes from a desert«, to increase incomes of the royal treasury and the king himself, and to restore wellbeing and create good conditions. These aims were supposed to be reached through foundations of new villages and towns, as well by reforming and populating already existing settlements by granting ius theutonicum. Moreover, for already existing towns, this grant was perceived as compensation for losses and destructions experienced from enemies, as an increase of prosperity and the possibility to get more benefits, to attract new dwellers. For that reason the royal grant of ius theutonicum was always a sign of gracia specialis. It was described as remuneration for industrious and faithful service, when granted to a lay man, or as a mark of the King's religious piety when granted to the Roman Church. Consequently, ius theutonicum could be rightly interpreted as something profitable and desirable, often granted ad peticiones.
In general, economic motives dominated grants of ius theutonicum: regardless of the region, »German law« was seen as a remedy for financial shortage, a suitable means to improve conditions to attract new settlers and to organize the land. However, the terminology used in the declared motivation drew attention to deeper reasons. The kings were concerned with reforming res et bona nostra, terra nostra, regnum Poloniae. In general, that meant they were aiming at re-forming and re-organizing possessions and incomes, their realm and finally the territory of the kingdom, establishing their influence and power over the economy and law in their domain.
References to Local Practice and its Meaning
The formula expressing the transfer to ius theutonicum frequently referred to local examples of already »located« towns, mentioning either a concrete town or the general practice in Galician Rus'. 64 One privilege contained a unique reference to the urban statute, »Will-kür«, which meant that not only »outer« but also »inner« rules and regulations of the town should be taken as a model.
At the same time, there was no evidence that any town of Galician Rus' turned to Magdeburg for legal advice. What is more, while establishing Ius supremum Theutonicum castri Cracoviensis in 1356, Kasimir the Great forbade any judicial consultation that went beyond his realm. In this way, he terminated the access to the supreme court of »Schöffen« of Magdeburg as a source of law. Taking into account these facts, as well as constant references to the local practice in the process of adoption of ius theutonicum, it is hardly possible to suppose that Ruthenian towns obtained »das nämliche Magdeburger Stadtrecht,« as stated by Jakowliw.
By adopting ius theutonicum, the rulers were establishing their own legal space with the king at the top of the jurisdictional hierarchy and not integrating at all into something that historians might call today »European legal space.«
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